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culties to which I have referred, I think the members of the League may still say, "It is our business to produce good citizens; it is right and necessary; it must be done; it shall be done; and it is we who have to make sure that it is done thoroughly." We cannot summon any bygone Milton to our aid to "give us manners, virtue, freedom, power." We must rather, if we are to gain any of these excellent things, work out our own salvation by continuous and indefatigable effort.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE IN RELATION TO MORALS AND RELIGION.

"The gods change, beloved. Ay, all save One, who makes love in the hearts of men."—*Kipling*.

I.

Attempts have been made by some modern biologists to prove that too great importance has been attached to the principle of natural selection and that other causes have had greater influence in bringing to pass what is commonly called evolution, *i. e.*, the descent, with modification, of all plants and animals from one primitive form of life.

Recent workers have shown that natural selection cannot itself be the *cause* of the variations which occur in plants and animals, nor indeed, although his language is sometimes obscure, does Darwin appear to have believed that natural selection did cause the variations. What he held was that the main instrument by which modifications were fixed and made permanent is the fact that among all living beings there is a constant struggle for existence (more being born than could survive), and that any organism that chances to come into the world endowed with an advantageous variation will survive and will bequeath this advantage to its descendants, the latter in course of time forming a new species. The problem of the ultimate origin of variations Darwin never

considered. Around it discussions center to-day, but they need not detain us. For most thinkers would accept the principle of selection in the form in which we have stated it, and it was in this form that it exerted an influence over the progress of the ethical thought of the later nineteenth century. Yet we must not be taken as insisting that all the philosophers whose views we are to notice in this paper were immediately under the influence of Darwin. Some no doubt write with Darwin's system constantly in mind; others, *e. g.*, Schopenhauer¹ (who died only one year later than the publication of the "Origin of Species") and Nietzsche² (who scoffs at Darwin as at most other English thinkers), have their philosophic tendencies determined merely by the general trend of thought, the interest in biology, its problems and methods, which characterized the nineteenth century. All alike, however, have constantly in mind the struggle for existence, the fierceness it breeds, the disappointments that result from it, and its apparent conflict with the deepest laws of morality and religion. For it turned out that that animal was most likely to survive which was strong and which used its strength to its own advantage, in selfish and unscrupulous craftiness. All the varied and beautiful forms of life which fill the world to-day were not formed, as the saints and prophets had imagined, by the direct fiat of an infinite and all-loving God, but had evolved by means of ruthless practice of all the vices that men most abhor. It is little wonder that the people in whom the intuitions of religion were strong were revolted by the theory, and declared that it overthrew the very foundations of human virtue. And even Huxley, the great defender of Darwin, found himself, when he considered the relation of human morality to

¹ Compare Höffding, "History of Modern Philosophy," Vol. II, p. 233: "Nevertheless in virtue of his will to live and of the great significance which he attributes to the strife and struggle of nature, he [Schopenhauer] must be regarded as a herald of the evolutionary theory in the form in which it was afterwards promulgated by Darwin."

² Compare Külpe, "Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland," p. 61: "Der biologische Gesichtspunkt, wonach alles unter die Herrschaft vitaler Zweckmässigkeit tritt, ist überhaupt für Nietzsches Lehren in ihrer letzten Fassung von dominierenden Bedeutung geworden."

the natural process of evolution, faced by a conclusion that obviously leaves him with a certain sense of uneasiness. In his famous Romanes lecture he says, "Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process."³ "The practice of that which is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence."⁴ He perpetually applies to the ethical code the terms artificial, non-natural. "We come to think," he says, "in the dialect of morals. An artificial personality, . . . conscience, is built up beside the natural personality."⁵ It is true that in notes and parentheses he declares that the life of man is after all a part of nature; yet he draws over and over again a distinction between the ordered garden of human society and the wild, untended forest of animal nature. He admits fully, and yet with an obvious misgiving, that the laws that rule or should rule human life are in many respects the very opposite of those that have caused the evolution of the animal world. And he does nothing whatever to solve this contradiction. He leaves us face to face with the two processes, "the cosmic struggle" that demands "ruthless self-assertion"⁶ and the moral life that "demands self-restraint;" "the cosmic process," he states, "has no sort of relation to moral ends."⁷

Precisely the same view is taken by another thinker of a very different stamp—Tolstoy. He is indeed more interested in the complete statement of what he takes to be the highest moral laws than in the working out of any scientific or philosophic explanation of them. He is a prophet, a seer of the unseen, and has the prophet's scorn of mere wordly knowledge. Science is to him the doctrine of the scribes, the false materialism that misleads man into the belief that the private, personal interest of his carnal individuality is the end of

³ "Evolution and Ethics," p. 81.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 81.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 30.

⁶ "Evolution and Ethics," p. 82.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 83.

life. If however, Tolstoy does make any reference to natural selection, he insists, as Huxley did, that in human society it is negated, overridden. "The life of man, as an individuality, aiming only at its own particular welfare among the infinite number of similar individualities, who destroy each other and annihilate themselves; that life is an evil and nonsense, and the true life cannot be of this nature."⁸ But he goes further; instead of regarding, as Huxley tends to do, the altruistic life of man in society as precarious and artificial, he insists with the emphasis of a mystic that only in self-abnegation and service of others can true happiness be found. "In spite of all his efforts man can never obtain welfare so long as he will not live in conformity to the law of his life. And the law of his life is not strife, but on the contrary a mutual exchange of services between all beings."⁹

The true human life, as compared to the life of the animal that still persists within man, is just the renunciation of the claims of self for the claims of others. Here, and here only, is human well-being to be found, not as a plant living a precarious life in a secluded garden, but as a mighty tree destined to spread more and more widely and finally to supersede altogether the lower form of life that depends on self-assertion.

But Tolstoy, like Huxley, simply sets these two modes of life over against one another; he does not explain how the one is related to or develops out of the other. Human life is in his view simply the negation of animal life.

Nietzsche solves the problem by adopting the position that obviously had suggested itself to Huxley only to be cast aside. He boldly declares that the life of self-renunciation is a sickly invention of the downtrodden masses, and represents an unwholesome revolt of the weak against the strong. He stoutly asserts that in human life, as among the animals, the law of self-assertion produces the finest results,¹⁰ and that man's one duty is to be strong, able, self-sufficing, and to avoid as fatal

⁸ "On Life" (Free Age Press), p. 32.

⁹ "On Life" (Free Age Press), p. 93.

¹⁰ "Wherever I found living matter I found will unto power." "Also sprach Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, p. 163.

to the highest life the weakening and degrading emotions of pity and sympathy. He contrasts the life of the free warrior, who loves and exults in danger and hardship, in all strenuous and healthy activities, with the pining, sickly existence of the slaves, whose mutual self-compassion and envy of their stronger masters gave birth, under the guidance of the ascetic priest, to Christianity, that religion of hate masquerading as love. "Your love for your neighbor is your bad love for yourselves."¹¹ "Wherever there are sacrifices and services and loving glances there is will to be master."¹² He urges men to put aside this craven pity and unselfishness, this underhand attempt to fight against the fundamental law of life, the search after power and more life, and in healthy strenuousness to express in and through their own personalities the relentlessness of the life-force.

"This new table, O my brethren, I put over you: 'Become hard.'"¹³

"And then it came also to pass that his word praised blessed selfishness, whole, healthy selfishness that springeth from a mighty soul."¹⁴

"Spare not thy neighbour. Man is a something that must be surpassed."¹⁵

As the last quotation indicates, this hearty approval of animal ruthlessness in the assertion of a man's own personality is given weight and significance by the thought of the superman.

"And Zarathustra thus spake unto the folk: '*I teach you beyond man.* Man is something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?

"'All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: And are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man? . . .

"'Beyond-man is the significance of earth, your will shall say: beyond-man shall be the significance of earth.

"'I conjure you, my brethren, *remain faithful to earth* and do not believe those who speak unto you of super-terrestrial hopes. Poisoners they are, whether they know it or not.'"¹⁶

¹¹ Ibid, p. 81.

¹² Ibid, p. 163.

¹³ Ibid, p. 319.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 282.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 296.

¹⁶ "Also sprach Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, pp. 5 and 6.

To Huxley, too, had come the same thought of the possibility of breeding a finer human being, but in an external, artificial fashion, and only to be rejected. Men might be bred better, as in a pigeon-fancier's polity,¹⁷ but he decides that the task of selecting and coercing the finest specimens is too great. His lukewarm conception is very different from Nietzsche's burning thought of a possible evolution of a stronger, nobler being—an evolution which we should strive to bring about by any means in our power, breaking, if it be necessary, all the old tablets of the law that enjoined on us gentleness, pity, forgiveness, all that asceticism of mere renunciation which stank in the philosopher's nostrils. If an attempt be made to grasp Nietzsche's central thought the reader comes to feel that a new breath has blown through his old theories, tearing down many that are moth-eaten and mildewed, vivifying and purifying others. There is a truth, a deep, mystic truth, in his wild, disconnected sayings. He clears our minds of hypocrisy and of cant. But has he grasped all the truth? Are the old ideals, the human ideals of unselfishness and sympathy, *merely* the foul miasma of the paltry envy of weaklings? May it not be that the miasma indeed is there and needs the wind's rough breath to drive it away, but that the old ideals, only veiled by the mist and not the mist's very self, will shine more clearly when the blustering breeze has swept it away? In the end of this essay an attempt will be made to suggest that this is the truth. In the meantime we must turn to some other thinkers.

Schopenhauer wrote before Darwin, and always rejected the conception of the evolution of higher forms of life from lower; but his thoughts are obviously inspired by biological science, and certain modern writers who owe much to Darwinism also work with categories first used by Schopenhauer. According to him all organisms are impelled by the will to live; during their whole existence they are urged on by the passionate search after life and more life. But true, self-sufficing life is never reached; all we feel, all the other animals

¹⁷ "Evolution and Ethics," p. 23.

feel, is the never-ceasing pressure of one desire after another. If the desire be unsatisfied, we are miserable; if satisfaction is attained, then satiety and melancholy follow. The will to live involves us in perpetual unhappiness. Nature cheats us for her ends, which are not ours, and which can never yield us bliss. In his analysis of sex-love, Schopenhauer drives home this view most thoroughly, and few who have read his cynical account of the lover's progress can avoid the thought that in only too many cases it is fundamentally and miserably true. The world then is full of wretchedness, and each step of advancement in life or in civilization brings more wretchedness. The only means of escape is to negate in ourselves this perpetual will to live, to resolve not to live, to strip ourselves of desires and wishes, and to enter on the path of self-renunciation. According to Schopenhauer this has been realized by all the great religions of the world, and they all advocate the path of quietism, the self-abnegation that leads to Nirvâna, the blessed rest of destruction and nothingness, where at last the ever-striving will is stilled. We need not pause at this stage to criticize Schopenhauer's pessimism, but may note his central thought (not dissimilar from Nietzsche's) of the everlasting *will to live*, that operates perpetually throughout the world of organized creatures. Students of contemporary writers on social and religious subjects will perceive that the latter commonly use the same conception, though with a different bias. Bernard Shaw, for example, speaks of the "life-force," and implies that it strives to get expression through the brains of living men for the purpose of raising and elevating human society. Ibsen, he declares, was the tool of the life-force when he wrote "The Doll's House," and the end aimed at by the impulse that moved him was the breaking down of the barriers which prevent women from attaining the independence of life and thought that is essential for future progress of the race. Mr. Shaw himself, with a genuine and living religion that is far more instrumental in getting things done than the apparently more reverential creed of those who think him a mere jester, feels himself an instrument in the hands of this "life-force," and is content

to be worn out and cast on the scrap heap if only he may advance its mightier ends. Mr. Wells speaks of the Good Will that is alive in men, and yet greater than any individual man; those impelled by it he names by the words that occur so often in his writings, "Men of Good Intent."

The same thought (which is really in its emotional bearings, in its half-comprehended relations, more like an emerging instinct than a purely intellectual conception, and which perhaps might be best named by Fouillée's phrase, *idée-force*), this same thought-force is seen in the recent interest excited by the discussion on the "Immanent God." From this discussion there emerges at all events the fact that many men find helpful the idea of a life greater than their own, which yet finds expression through them; of a will that links them to the animal kingdom on the one hand (from which all now admit we have emerged) and on the other to that great and mystic reality of which we are conscious in religion and which most men name God.

Here we seem to see dimly a possibility of that reconciliation between religion and science which this age needs so greatly, which is indeed the first requisite for making possible, without unwholesome violence, the solving of the problem of the present disastrous poverty of many sections of society. For thinking men are coming to believe that self-interest and the cold light of science are equally insufficient to bring us safely through the tangled web of perplexities and injustices that confront us. Some force of personal devotion is needed to inspire us with the glow of determination, the warm emotion of helpfulness, which are necessary agents in the building up of a new social system. Religion, personal, keenly felt religion, must come back to life; yet it must not be longer at conflict with science. For one thing, at least, the nineteenth century has taught man;—that the truth, discovered from careful study of the physical universe, is sacred, is a genuine reality that cannot and must not be set aside. The modern religious consciousness itself demands that an altar to science be enshrined within the temple, and that no rites remain which cannot honestly be celebrated in the presence of that

sanctuary. The restatement of religion for which the modern world is waiting must satisfy three demands at once; it must supply a motive for the amelioration of human society, it must be absolutely consistent with science, and it must provide an outlet for the personal and intimate practice of devotion.

Thus may a yawning wound in the modern soul be cured, and that soul, healed for a time of its doubt, hesitation and insufficiency, set forth once more with joy on its pathway toward fuller life.

II.

Such a religion is dimly appearing. The conception due to biological science, of the struggle for existence, appears, when translated into philosophy, as the will to live, and that will is thought of as animating in different degrees and in different ways plants, animals and men. But from our sketch of the philosophers who have used this conception it will be clear that one great difficulty exists. The will to live is in animals and plants (speaking broadly) a purely selfish and individual one. Each organism seeks perpetually its own pleasure and its own life, and in this search must strive with two opposing forces, the lifeless environment and the existence of other animals. The first it cannot to any considerable extent alter, and therefore the will to live expresses itself through the animal by adaptation to the environment.¹⁸ Thus giraffes grow long necks, herons long legs, the eyes of moles degenerate, etc. But there is more than this modification of the body of the animal. There is also modification of its desires and instincts. For most animals the supply of food is uncertain; hence desire for it must be keen in order to impel the animal to unremitting search. On occasions food is found in large

¹⁸ For our purpose there is no need to discuss the various difficult questions connected with the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or continuous or discontinuous congenital variations. It is sufficient for us that variations, whether acquired or congenital, continuous or discontinuous, do, when winnowed by natural selection, give rise normally to the gradual evolution of finer and stronger forms of life, ever better adapted to their environment.

quantities; then the animal must learn to gorge in order to tide it over the only too probable season of scarcity. Hence nature, to secure life and more life, coarsens and makes gross the desires that support the bodily existence. Could an animal be conscious of itself, it might know that in order to preserve that precarious spark of life within it and to hand it on to its descendants, it was its duty to be gluttonous and lustful.

At this stage the "life-force" must work through the individual bodily existence. But that existence is threatened not alone by an indifferent or unfavorable environment, but also by other animals, against whom it must defend itself. All life strives to live, all at this stage fights, ought to fight, to scheme, to kill, in order to preserve alive its portion of the "will to live." Thus by incessant conflict, by what to us are the vices of gluttony and lustfulness, of selfishness that reaches even to murder, of unscrupulousness that attains to treachery, was life trained and led to a higher level. The advance to this level is begun when the embodied spark of life learns that other sparks of life with like feelings and desires to itself animate other portions of matter. How this recognition of other personalities akin to oneself occurs is a problem that psychology has never yet faced. Obviously the lower animals know only their own organic sensations, and respond very vaguely to external stimuli. But in the scale of advancing life somewhere this step is made. First the self, identified with the body, is distinguished in a fashion from the external world, and then it is discovered that certain portions of that external world are also living beings, selves similar to our own self. This recognition almost certainly must arise, in racial development, in connection with sex and parentage, and especially the latter. In the relation of the mother to her child the struggle for existence is for a time superseded; she lives for it, not for herself, and is prepared to die even in its defense. Gradually this relation extends itself and comes to include the male as well as the mother and child, and there is established a little social group within which the old animal virtues of self-assertion are superseded by the new social virtues of self-

renunciation. These groups are more and more frequent and more and more permanent as we rise in the animal scale. Among the social insects (perhaps—who knows?—an early attempt of the life-force to attain those unknown ends which men are *now* blindly laboring to achieve), community of life with all its attendant virtues is very highly developed. But among mammals, man alone has evolved an organized social life on any considerable scale. And this has been attained piecemeal. Beginning with the loose organization of the horde, hardly distinguishable from the undefined groups of some of the higher mammals, mankind has passed slowly to the various forms of family life, to the tribe, the city-state, the village community, the nation, the federated commonwealth. Always *within* these communities the struggle for existence is to some extent suspended. We allow no man to die whose life may be saved, though we are still willing to allow the lives of many men to be rendered stunted and miserable by unhappy conditions. For a time, the natural state of perpetual war (Hobbes was in a sense right, after all) persisted between communities, and was indeed often a means of progress. But now our advance in social feeling is so great that vast numbers of people are declaring war absurd and wrong, and in practice our humanitarian modification of its conditions is rapidly depriving it of its *raison d'être* from the biological standpoint. We kill, indeed, in war, sending to slaughter the finest specimens of our own nation, but we always save as many of the wounded enemies as possible and we rarely deprive them of their territory. War is to-day no more than a foolish and barbarian survival of earlier times. Soon, it seems to many, wars will rage no more on earth, and the brutal animal method of natural selection will pass away.

Speaking generally, indeed, it is this capacity for social life, this power to stand aside from the struggle for existence, at least in its crass physical form, that distinguishes man from the mass of the animal kingdom. And by some religions and systems of morality it is commanded that men should not participate in even the finer forms of rivalry, competition for wealth and for power.

At all events man has preëminently this power to feel the good of his own life in the lives of others, and to lose his narrow personal good in the good of his family, or tribe, or city, or nation, or in the good of humanity itself. His personality is no longer bounded by his animal individuality; in love and service he transcends his own selfish aims and conceives a wider good in which his own is involved, or to which, it may be, he is even willing that his own should be sacrificed. But he differs from the animals in another point of great importance. They are bound by their environment, and to stimulate them to get the utmost possible out of that environment, the will to live expresses itself in them in fierce bodily desires. But man may modify, does increasingly modify, his environment. The fulfilment of his bodily desires in large sections of society becomes always easier, and in some cases has now no limit save the man's own will. Therefore the keen animal desires, formerly necessary for life, are now a hindrance; to eat, for instance, to satiety, impairs efficiency, does not increase it. Man, as he grows in civilization, feels more and more the weight of the physical desires; like atrophied organs they are the source of much disease. Our vices are indeed but the outgrown virtues of our animal ancestry. To raise and increase the amount and quality of human life they must be increasingly controlled. Man then becomes conscious that his finest and fullest life is only possible in obedience to two principles, both of which reverse the duty of the animal: (a) to care not for his own personal life but for the lives of others; (b) to war constantly against the atavistic animal instincts which we call sins. Putting it into the language of morality, love and purity comprise the duty of man.

But man did not wait for the teachings of biological science to impose on himself these duties. Long ago they were announced to him by another agency—that of religion.

Religion is always that set of emotions, directed toward some group of superhuman beings, or one single deity, that holds together any given form of human society. The tribes have their own idols, the city-states their gods, the

nations their national churches. Each inferior form of human organization has its inferior deity. But we have learned in recent years to distinguish these pagan and incomplete creeds from the world-wide religions where is proclaimed the duty of love, not merely of one's own family or community, but of humanity at large; indeed men in whom the religious and moral consciousness is most fully developed go further and include, as did Buddha and St. Francis, within the sphere of love the animal and even the vegetable kingdom.¹⁹

These same religions (religions of envious weaklings, according to Nietzsche) also lay stress on the need of purity, of self-discipline; they call on us to emerge from the animal existence which seeks satisfaction from bodily desires, and aims at its own good in opposition to the good of others, and to enter on the spiritual life where purity and love rule. This is so well known that quotations are hardly necessary. The following may suffice:

"Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven."²⁰

"Let no man seek his own, but each his neighbor's good."²¹

"Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey the lusts thereof."²²

"Beloved, I beseech you as sojourners and pilgrims, to abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul."²³

Compare the following precepts of Buddhism:

"Abstain from destroying life."

"Abstain from fornication and all uncleanness."

"Abstain from fermented liquor, spirits and strong drink, which are a hindrance to merit."

"Abstain from eating at forbidden times."²⁴

All religions stand for the energizing of a special form of social feeling. But the greatest religions make clear the abso-

¹⁹ Compare Warren, "Buddhism in Translation," p. 431.

²⁰ Matthew 5: 44.

²¹ I Cor. 10: 24.

²² Rom. 6: 12.

²³ I Peter 2: 11.

²⁴ "Buddhism in Translation," Warren, p. 397.

lute unity of all life and our duty to sink our personal existence and sacrifice it to that greater life. Now it is these greater religions that lay (as James has shown) special stress on the necessity of conversion.

Keeping in mind the previous remarks on the opposition between the animal duties of self-assertion and the human and social duties of self-renunciation, let us recall the main facts in conversion as given by Starbuck: "Conversion is primarily an unselfing. . . . It is part of [the individual's] oldest and deepest seated instinct to preserve his own integrity. But it is part of Nature's way to crush that which is out of harmony with herself. The social will is stronger, and the individual must at last surrender himself to it. . . . The individual learns to transfer himself from a center of self-activity into an organ of revelation of universal being, and to live a life of affection for and oneness with the larger life outside."²⁵

This point comes out even more clearly in quotations from the various documents describing the feelings subsequent to conversion:

"I had more tender feeling toward my family and friends." F. 17.

"I felt for everyone and loved my friends better." F. 16.

"I felt everybody to be my friend." M. 19.

"I felt in harmony with everybody, and all creation and its Creator." M. 15.²⁶

"I experienced a complete change of conduct; I left off the old habits of drink and profanity without an effort." M. 23.²⁷

In fact, conversion, whether as a sudden experience or as the slow turning of the soul toward religion, is the final triumph of the true human spirit over its animal heritage. It produces normally a feeling of escape from a narrow personality into union with a mightier Will, and it fills the spirit with a resolve to conquer the lusts of the flesh, and to live in love with all men. "Those who are truly converted are kind-hearted, indulgent, praising the works of their neigh-

²⁵ Starbuck, "Psychology of Religion," p. 145-7 *passim*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 127, 128, *passim*.

²⁷ Starbuck, "Psychology of Religion," p. 133.

bor as far as they can, and they rejoice in his well-being and have sympathy with him in his troubles. They are decorous in the satisfaction of their natural wants, shunning all excess, and if they by accident transgress, avoiding it for the future." ²⁸

Now in most of the writers studied so far it is suggested that there is an opposition between this moral and spiritual life of man, and the process of biological evolution as revealed by science. But if we assume the constant energizing, constant pressing forward of the "Will to Live," it becomes possible to reconcile them.

The "will to live," in its struggle for expression, rises first to fierce intensity in individual animals, this individuality being modified only occasionally in the higher animals by certain facts of sex and parentage. The "Will to Live" appears here in its *intensive* form, willing to sacrifice to its one narrow but glowing spark all other life that comes its way. But life is not to be measured by intension alone, but also by extension, and a life that wills the death of all that it needs as food, or of all that excites its hostility, may often be not an agency of life, but of death (as are tigers and serpents, as were many great conquerors). The "Will to Live" in such a case is intense indeed, but is circumscribed and narrow. There is need of greater breadth, wider inclusion. This is gained when gradually there arises the will not merely that oneself should live, but that others also should live, and finally the resolve that others shall live even at the sacrifice of oneself.

Does not after all the Will for Life, to change the phrase, bring to pass a greater mass of happy living in altruistic mankind than in the selfish tiger, and if there be really an animating will behind all organized existence—and to the reality of this will many of the facts alike of biology and of religion point—will it not urge us further on the path of service of others, and of the control of those animal appetites that hinder so

²⁸ Dr. John Tauler. Sermon VII, as quoted in the "Message of Man," p. 37.

greatly our efficiency in civilized life? The "Will for Life" must, after it has established itself in this world in the animal's fierce desire for fullness of personal existence, expand in later organisms into the will that others too should increase in life.

The one phase, the ethical process, is indeed opposed to the cosmic movement as unselfishness to selfishness, as self-control to self-gratification, yet from another point of view it carries out more adequately and attains more fully the aim that always underlies its opposite, *i. e.*, the maximization of life. Mystics of all ages have declared that it is always possible for man, through self-discipline and self-submission, to attain union with the ultimate source of all existence, to reach the ecstasy of oneness with God. And it is declared to be the common experience that on emergence from that ecstasy, the devotee knows at one and the same time a great exaltation of his own life, a strong yearning for purity, and a keener desire to serve others. Wise men of all ages have asserted that only in this way, in submission of the personal will to a larger purpose, in self-control and in loving service of all that exists, come true peace and happiness for men. We who find it hard to reach these mystical heights may know, at all events, by experience the truth of the Hedonistic paradox, "happiness is not to be won by looking for it, but by losing oneself in another object external to oneself"—generally the good, as T. H. Green said, of some group of persons.

III.

From this standpoint, then, how shall we estimate the worth of those opinions which we glanced at in the earlier part of the paper?

We may claim that this conception of the underlying similarity of the progress of life through natural selection, and through conscious community of existence, explains and enlarges Huxley's views. It turns out that man is not a fragile reed, a delicate plant in an artificial garden, but that he embodies in himself, in a better and higher form, the same

forces that urge on the cosmic process of life. We acknowledge the fundamental truth in Tolstoy's view; his doctrine sets forth, as did Christ's and Buddha's before him, the aim for which human existence must strive. Yet we may believe this without Tolstoy's rather irritating scorn for science, and since we realize that this life of man is a process of slow evolution, we may see without bitterness the ideal which blazes in his words attain now only an imperfect fulfilment, content with the belief that its perfect fulfilment will come. What of Schopenhauer? The fundamental fallacy of his thought is that he identifies the animal will to live with the human will. But humanity can only find happiness in the satisfaction of the will of others, *i. e.*, in *love*. The very fact that the human mind can "look before and after" shows it the transitoriness, the unsatisfactoriness of the animal and purely personal desires. In conscious search for the good of others, on the other hand, there arises a strong, mysterious sense of happiness, a sense that the human spirit has at last found an atmosphere natural to it. But if forced to stay in the lower atmosphere of personal selfishness, it gasps and faints with a misery which it does not understand and attributes in its ignorance to the universe as a whole. Schopenhauer's pessimism, in short, rests on his egotism. But it is a needed and valuable protest against the shallow optimism of the healthy animal.

And what of Nietzsche? He too identifies life with this personal demand for existence, but differs fundamentally from Schopenhauer in that he contemplates the incessant emergence of vitality with joy and not with depression. Neurotic and invalid though he was, Nietzsche yet voices better than any other writer the keen pleasure in mere physical life, that is veritably a very fine and good thing in its way. Laughing and singing and a fierce contempt of danger must accompany all noble life in his view, and he expresses fiercely the contempt of the natural man for the way of the ascetic and the twice-born saint. Now there is no doubt that the protest of Nietzsche has its justification. True saintliness perhaps comes nearer to the real meaning of Nietzsche's conception of

the superman than anything else on earth, as we shall see shortly. But there is a false and cowardly piety, which exists only as a cover for weakling souls, that clings fast to the old creed that is familiar, that dare not think or experiment, that delights in hunting out heresy, that cramps growing spirits by outworn dogmas, that cares more to save its own paltry soul than to save the world, and shrinks from all keen joy in life as from an evil thing. This type is, indeed, incarnate in Mrs. Dudgeon in "The Devil's Disciple." Against this false and noisome religiousness that is content with the mean, ugly and base, Nietzsche's protest was justified. And moreover, even genuine piety tends at one stage to think that asceticism is good in and for itself, and not merely as a guide to the higher life. "Despisers of body" Nietzsche calls these people, and thus describes them. "Once soul looked contemptuously upon body, that contempt then being the highest ideal—soul wished the body meagre, hideous, starved. Thus soul thought it could escape body and death."²⁹

But this asceticism may and does defeat its own ends. The human body exists, it is true, *only* as a vehicle for the soul, but yet as a vehicle for the soul. And among a certain section of Western peoples, at all events, perfect, hard healthiness of body is now being regarded as one of the ends of the moral life. Modern medical science is beginning to show us, with its theories of the open-air life and of limitation of diet, that in merely following the most healthy *régime* there is abundant scope for asceticism.

From another point Nietzsche suggests a valuable thought—in his conception of the "superman." So far morality and religion, in setting ultimate aims before the human soul, have tended to adopt one of two ends—personal salvation either for self or others, to result in bliss (conceived more or less materially) in an after world. This conception (though it again is more an *idée-force*, a thought-force, than a purely intellectual attitude) may tend either to a lofty kind of personal selfishness or to the preaching of a submission to mean and wretched cir-

²⁹ "Thus spake Zarathustra," trans. by A. Tille, p. 6.

cumstances in consideration of happiness hereafter.³⁰ If the submission is urged by the prosperous in wordly goods upon the unprosperous, there is more than a suspicion of hypocrisy, a "stench," as Nietzsche would say.

Hence there comes often a reaction to another type of thought—to Utilitarianism. "Make people happy here and now," it says; "enjoy the many pleasures and delights of this material world; help as many others as possible to enjoy them with you." To the kind-hearted and rather unimaginative man this creed will be quite satisfactory, especially if he is faced, as were the early Utilitarians, with crying social evils demanding only, it seemed, quite simple remedies. But to the more highly strung man, who is filled with a theoretic passion for democracy—or, to use our new phraseology, in whom the life-force calls out for as large an extension as possible—who yet finds in himself a practical dislike of vulgar personalities—the life-force demanding also intensive expression—this man can only be stirred to abiding depression and disgust by our present democracy, with its hideous towns, its low level of physical and mental efficiency, its numbness to literature and art, its lack of real beauty or distinction. Such a man must place his future good not in some transcendental bliss in some unknown heaven; it must be realized on this earth. Yet it cannot be simply to provide for Englishmen of the common banal type the happiness they now appreciate. To a man of this character, when he has read Nietzsche, there comes the conception of the superman—of the future being in whom all the forces of life will be increased far beyond what we know now, who is to be at once harder and healthier, and more sensitive and comprehending—and a thought frames itself in his mind of a democracy that levels up and not down. Such a conception supplies what the educated man needs as an ideal. It suggests to him well-being on this earth, yet a well-being

³⁰ "Such sayings I heard pious back-worlds-men say unto their conscience: 'Let the world be the world, lift not even a finger against it. Let anybody who careth to do so, throttle and sting and flay and scrape the folk. Thereby they shall one day learn to renounce the world. Break, break, O my brethren, these old tablets of the pious.'" Ibid, p. 305.

that is as much spiritual as material. It supplies him with a motive for striving to reach his own perfection in body, mind, and soul; it furnishes him with a motive for endeavoring politically to remedy the social conditions of to-day; for supermen cannot be bred in slums. In short, Nietzsche's thought of the superman bids fair to act as a reconciler of very different religious and moral conceptions.

But Nietzsche's view has its deficiencies. He was in reaction against the unhealthy asceticism of his time—often, as he himself says, the mere symptom of degeneration and insufficient vitality—and against the altruism that leveled down, instead of leveling up, the altruism that is content to have always with us the poor and sick, as objects for the exercise of charity and unselfishness, instead of burning with a fierce determination to see the end of poverty and sickness. In consequence, the superman of Nietzsche turns away in disgust, puts out of sight all victims of ebbing vitality; he himself and his comrades will have nothing to do with such morbidness; their one aim is to keep alight within themselves that burning flame of intensity of life. No ignoble aim! Ill health and poverty *should* be hated; health and life *should* be cherished.

But yet in true human society, not mere intensity but extensity of life ought to be desired. Our hearts echo to that noble saying, "A civilization that is squalid anywhere is squalid everywhere."

The superman, if he is to be human, and not a glorified animal, must always keep in mind that the life-force works in us in two directions. He will have, indeed, the animal virtues of fierce vitality and perfect health, will grow in a straight line upwards; he must have also the human virtues of unselfishness and helpfulness, must have sympathy so radiating through the lives of other personalities that they may form with his a continuous plane. Indeed, the problem of the future, to put it in a different way, is to unite the pagan with the Christian character, and it turns out that, after all, the true superman must have in him more than a dash of the Christian saint, alike on his benevolent and on his contemplative side. For if there be truth in our hypothesis that religion is the full-

est and purest channel through which the life-force reaches us, then it will be the superman's duty to prepare himself to receive this life-force in religious meditation and prayer, and it will be for him too to free his life from any brutish re-emergence of the earlier selfish instincts. This threefold aim is well given in the following prayer :

"O God, enable me to feel my oneness with all things in Thee. Burn out of me my baseness and make me wholly part of Thy pure flame. Help me to prove my brotherhood by constant, joyful service."²¹

By living in this spirit alone can we make for the emergence of the superman, in whom life must not be merely intensive, but also extensive—so much so, indeed, that there can be no single superman in the fullest sense until all human society consists of supermen.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS.

The evolutionary point of view has had more than one important result for philosophical thought. Not the least important among these has been the conception of the evolution of evolution. Not only can we trace in the history of thought the evolution of the conception of evolution, but we find ourselves with a consciousness which we conceive of as evolved; the contents and the forms of these contents can be looked upon as the products of development. Among these contents and forms are found the temporal and spatial qualities of things, of the world. The very time process as well as the space of the universe lies in experience which is itself presented as the result of an evolution that arises in and through spatial conditions, which is first and foremost a temporal process.

The peculiarity of this situation lies in the fact that the involution appears in the immediate findings of science. Our

²¹ Winslow Hall, "Applied Religion," p. 122.